Abstract. Asymmetric pairings e : G 1 × G 2 → G T for which an efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 is known are called Type 2 pairings; if such an isomorphism ψ is not known then e is called a Type 3 pairing. Many cryptographic protocols in the asymmetric setting rely on the existence of ψ for their security reduction while some use it in the protocol itself. For these reasons, it is believed that some of these protocols cannot be implemented with Type 3 pairings, while for some the security reductions either cannot be transformed to the Type 3 setting or else require a stronger complexity assumption. Contrary to these widely held beliefs, we argue that Type 2 pairings are merely inefficient implementations of Type 3 pairings, and appear to offer no benefit for protocols based on asymmetric pairings from the point of view of functionality, security, and performance.
Introduction
Pairing-based cryptography, though proposed only at the turn of the century, has witnessed a tremendous growth. The successful application of pairings in the design of novel cryptographic protocols [29, 34, 8] and their potential use as a principal building block for many others fuelled this growth. The main thrust of research efforts in this area has been, and still is, in the development of new protocols.
For three groups G 1 , G 2 , G T of the same (prime) order, a pairing is a function e : G 1 × G 2 → G T that is bilinear, non-degenerate, and efficiently computable. If G 1 = G 2 then the pairing is symmetric and following [25] we call it a Type 1 pairing. The pairing is asymmetric when G 1 = G 2 . In the asymmetric setting, if there is an efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 then e is called a Type 2 pairing. If no efficiently-computable isomorphism is known from G 2 to G 1 (or from G 1 to G 2 ) then we call it Type 3. Known examples of such pairings are the Weil and Tate pairings over suitable elliptic curve groups G 1 and G 2 , and their modifications such as the ate pairing [28] and the R-ate pairing [31] . 1 Since Type 1 pairings are quite restricted in terms of the choice of curves and are significantly slower than their asymmetric counterparts at higher security levels [27] , they will not be considered in the remainder of this paper.
Recent work [25] suggests that Type 3 is a better choice than Type 2 in terms of the size of elements in G 2 , the cost of performing group operations in G 2 , the cost of membership testing in G 2 , the feasibility of hashing into G 2 , and the cost of the pairing operation. However, these performance advantages do not immediately make Type 3 pairings an obvious choice for protocols described in the asymmetric setting. Cryptographic protocols are designed to realize some concrete functionality in a secure way. The question of security is intrinsic to Date: September 27, 2009; revised on May 3, 2011. 1 Cryptographically suitable pairings can also be defined from hyperelliptic curves and, more generally, from abelian varieties [24] . Since elliptic curve pairings are believed to offer superior performance, this paper will only be concerned with pairings derived from elliptic curves.
that of functionality for such protocols. The question of efficiency enters only after issues of functionality and security have been settled. In the context of pairing-based protocols in the asymmetric setting, Type 3 can be considered to be a better choice only if it is possible to argue that whatever is achievable in terms of functionality and security in Type 2 can also be achieved in Type 3, and moreover if the overall performance of the Type 3 version of the protocol is at least as good (if not better) than its Type 2 counterpart.
Performance apart, the key difference between Type 2 and Type 3 is the existence or otherwise of the map ψ. While there exist some protocols in the asymmetric setting which do not require ψ to be efficiently computable, there are many others which do -either in the security proof or in the protocol itself. For example, consider the very first protocol described in the asymmetric setting -the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) short signature scheme [10] . In [10] the authors observed that the efficiently-computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 is essential for the security of the protocol and can be avoided only at the cost of making a stronger complexity assumption. The same argument was later echoed by Shacham in his PhD Thesis [35] which asserts that "the map [ψ] isn't merely a proof artifact". These observations were likely instrumental in causing much of the subsequent work in pairing-based cryptography to consider the Type 2 setting as the natural choice either when proposing a new protocol or when modifying a protocol from the symmetric to the asymmetric setting. While most of these protocols need ψ in the security argument only, some do use it in the protocol itself. The use of ψ in a protocol might further be construed as evidence that the map ψ cannot possibly be avoided altogether even if one is prepared to make stronger complexity assumptions.
Galbraith, Paterson and Smart [25] provided an excellent exposition of what is achievable and what isn't when a particular type of pairing is employed. They too comment that for many pairing-based primitives, the "security proof does not apply if the cryptosystem is implemented using pairings of the third type" (i.e., Type 3). Since Type 3 offers better performance and flexibility they conclude that it would be desirable if protocol designers prove the security of their protocol in the Type 3 setting.
One possible way to address the need for ψ in some security reductions is to use relativized assumptions as introduced by Smart and Vercauteren [37] . Here, it is assumed that an underlying hard problem remains hard even when the adversary is given oracle access to ψ. Such oracle access allows a security reduction to go through in the Type 3 setting even when one cannot efficiently compute ψ. Smart and Vercauteren discuss the security of BLS and the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption (BF-IBE) scheme under this kind of relativized assumption. Their approach was further pursued by Chen, Cheng and Smart [19] to prove the security of some identity-based key agreement protocols in the Type 3 setting.
In [16] Chatterjee et al. took a closer look at the security and efficiency aspects of two signature schemes and two aggregate signature schemes when implemented with BarretoNaehrig (BN) elliptic curves [4] . One of the contributions of that work is to establish that there is no security (or performance) benefit to be gained by using a Type 2 pairing instead of Type 3 for the particular schemes under consideration. For example, compared to Type 2, the BLS signature scheme in Type 3 does not depend on a stronger complexity assumption as was stated in [10] , nor is it necessary to use a relativized assumption as suggested in [37] . This motivated us to further investigate the exact role played by ψ in pairing-based protocols and in their security arguments. The current work takes the findings of [16] as its starting point and can be seen as its sequel in a broader canvas.
Specifically, we find it relevant to raise the following questions. Can any cryptographic protocol originally described in the Type 2 setting be transformed to the Type 3 setting?
What about the security of the transformed protocol -is it equivalent to the original one? Is there any performance benefit to be accrued by working in the Type 3 setting after such a transformation?
Our study indicates that given any protocol, Protocol-2, described using a Type-2 pairing, and a security proof for Protocol-2 with respect to some problem P-2, there is a natural transformation of Protocol-2 to a Protocol-3 that uses a Type-3 pairing, a natural transformation of P-2 to P-3, and a natural transformation of the security proof to one for Protocol-3 with respect to P-3. Moreover, Protocol-3 is at least as efficient as Protocol-2, and P-3 is equally as hard as P-2 (for appropriately chosen parameters). In other words, ψ does not play any cryptographically significant role and hence there is no reason to use Protocol-2 instead of Protocol-3.
We emphasize that our arguments that any Type 2 protocol can be converted to a Type 3 protocol without loss of functionality, security or efficiency are empirical. In particular, we leave it as an open question to determine the existence of a (natural) Type 2 protocol that has no (natural, secure and efficient) counterpart in the Type 3 setting.
We note that Freeman [22] recently proposed an abstract framework for converting some composite-order pairing-based protocols to the setting of prime-order pairings. In contrast, our work looks at the problem of converting protocols from Type 2 setting to the Type 3 setting, both of which are defined over prime-order groups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we compare the performance of Type 2 and Type 3 pairings derived from elliptic curves having even embedding degree. The complexity assumptions in the asymmetric setting are reviewed in §3 and we demonstrate that for each complexity assumption in Type 2, there is a natural counterpart in Type 3 such that the two problems are equivalent when parameters are chosen in an appropriate way. §4 is devoted to existing protocols in the asymmetric setting. We show how some known protocols in the Type 2 setting can be transformed into Type 3 without affecting the functionality or security, and moreover it is sometimes possible to obtain better performance. These observations are extended in §5 where we provide general guidelines on how to transform a given protocol as well as its security argument from Type 2 to Type 3. Finally, we conclude in §6 with some open problems which we think will shed further light on the role of ψ in the context of cryptographic protocols in the asymmetric setting.
Asymmetric Pairings
Let F q be a finite field of characteristic p ≥ 5, and let E be an ordinary elliptic curve defined over F q . Let n be a prime divisor of #E(F q ) satisfying gcd(n, q) = 1, and let k (the embedding degree) be the smallest positive integer such that n | q k − 1. We will assume that k > 1, whence E[n] ⊆ E(F q k ) where E[n] denotes the n-torsion group of E. We further assume that n 3 ∤ #E(F q k ). Let G T be the order-n subgroup of F * q k . The (full) Tate pairing is a non-degenerate bilinear functionê : E[n] × E[n] → G T and can be defined as follows:
where R ∈ E(F q k ) with R ∈ {∞, P, −Q, P − Q}, and where the Miller function f n,P is a function whose only zeros and poles in E are a zero of order n at P and a pole of order n at ∞. For cryptographic applications, one generally restricts the domain ofê to a product of two order-n subgroups G 1 and G 2 of E[n]. The first group G 1 is taken to be E(F q )[n], and any other order-n subgroup can be selected for the second group G 2 . Then the definition ofê simplifies toê(P, Q) = (f n,P (Q)) (q k −1)/n for all P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 [3] . Moreover, one assumes k to be even because then the 'denominator elimination' [3] speedup is applicable for the Type 3 pairings defined next.
2.1. Type 3 pairings. Following [25] , we denote by D the CM discriminant of E and set
and d = k/e. For example, BN curves [4] have k = 12, e = 6 and d = 2, whereas MNT curves [33] have k = 6, e = 2 and d = 3. Now, E has a unique degree-e twistẼ defined over F q d such that n | #Ẽ(F q d ) [28] . LetP 2 ∈Ẽ(F q d ) be a point of order n, and let
The group G 2 = P 2 is the Trace-0 subgroup of E[n], so named because it consists of all points P ∈ E[n] for which Tr(P ) =
is the Frobenius map. The monomorphism φ can be defined so that φ :G 2 → G 2 is efficiently computable in both directions; therefore we can identifyG 2 and G 2 , and consequently G 2 can be viewed as having coordinates in F q d (instead of in the larger field F q k ). The restriction ofê to G 1 × G 2 gives a pairing t n : G 1 × G 2 → G T that is of the Type 3 variety because no efficiently-computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 is known. Several Type 3 pairings that are faster to evaluate have been discovered. Among these are the ate pairing [28] , the R-ate pairing [31] , and Vercauteren's optimal pairing [38] . These pairings, which we will collectively denote by e 3 : 
2N . Notice that this choice of pairing is without much loss of generality since in any cryptographic application it makes no difference if the pairing is replaced by its (2N )-th power. As first shown in [30] , the computation of e 2 is easily reduced to the task of computing e 3 .
Lemma 1 ([30]). Let
∞, and henceQ ∈ G 2 . Finally, Table 3 of [25] ; see also Table 5 of [19] . However, as observed in [16] , points in G ′ 2 have a shorter representation which we describe next. We emphasize that this representation can be used for all order-n subgroups
is an efficiently-computable isomorphism with ψ(P
is an efficiently-computable isomorphism with ρ(P ′ 2 ) = cP 2 . Now, given a point Q ∈ G ′ 2 , one can efficiently determine the unique points
whose inverse is also efficiently computable. Hence, without loss of generality, points Q ∈ G ′ 2 can be represented by a pair of points (Q 1 , Q 2 ) with Q 1 ∈ G 1 and Q 2 ∈ G 2 . Note that arithmetic in G Table 2 of [16] lists the costs of performing basic operations in G 1 , G 2 and G ′ 2 for a particular BN curve. The table confirms the expectation that basic operations in G ′ 2 are only marginally more expensive than the operations in G 2 . One exception is that testing membership in G ′ 2 is several times more expensive than membership testing in G 2 since the former requires two pairing operations.
In summary, we have shown that whereas the basic operations in the Type 2 group G ′ 2 are indeed more expensive than in the Type 3 group G 2 , the differences are not as high as previously reported. The same is true for the bitlengths of points in G ′ 2 versus G 2 . The remainder of the paper will compare the security and efficiency of protocols that use the pairings e 2 or e 3 . For consistency with the literature on pairing-based protocols, we will use multiplicative notation for elements of G 1 , G 2 and G ′ 2 . In particular, the generators of these groups will be denoted by g 1 , g 2 and g ′ 2 , and the identity element will be denoted by 1.
Hardness Assumptions in the Asymmetric Setting
Security of a pairing-based protocol is based on some hard problem in the respective pairing groups. The standard practice is to argue the security of the protocol in terms of a reduction from the hard problem to breaking the protocol in an appropriate security model. Suppose that we have a protocol, Protocol-2, described in the Type 2 setting whose security is based on some hard problem P-2 in that setting. Also suppose that we have some means of obtaining a version of Protocol-2, say Protocol-3, in the Type 3 setting which achieves the same functionality as Protocol-2. Simultaneously, we would like the assurance that Protocol-3 is at least as secure as Protocol-2. One way to achieve this is to define a version of problem P-2, say P-3 in the Type 3 setting, and then argue the security of Protocol-3 based on P-3. Now, if P-3 can be shown to be at least as hard as P-2, then the assurance provided by the reduction for Protocol-3 is at least as high as the assurance provided by the reduction for Protocol-2. If P-2 and P-3 are computationally equivalent, then the assurances provided by the reductions are the same. Hence the security of Protocol-2 and Protocol-3 can be compared if one can find a way to define P-3 so that it is at least as hard as P-2.
For example, as shown in [16] , security of BLS in the Type 2 setting is based on the co-DHP problem (compute h z given h ∈ G 1 and g
, whereas security of BLS in the Type 3 setting is based on the co-DHP* problem (compute h z given h, g z 1 ∈ G 1 and g z 2 ∈ G 2 ). Furthermore, these two problems are equivalent if the generators g 1 , g 2 , g ′ 2 are appropriately chosen. We next show equivalence of the Type 2 and Type 3 variants of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem.
3.1. The bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. BDH was originally defined in the symmetric setting [8] and later extended to the asymmetric setting [26, 13] . It is possible to define several versions of the problem in the asymmetric setting -see e.g., [37, 12] and Remark 2. We consider the following version of the problem in Type 2 used by Galindo in [26] and which is the same as the problem discussed in [13] when specialized to Type 2.
the BDH-2 problem is to compute the Type 2 pairing value
αβγ . The BDH-2 assumption asserts that BDH-2 is hard. The decisional version DBDH-2 of the problem is to decide, given (g
αβγ . The DBDH-2 assumption is that DBDH-2 is hard.
We define a version of the BDH-2 problem in Type 3 as follows.
Definition 2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem in Type 3 (BDH-3)). Given g
for α, β, γ ∈ R Z n , the BDH-3 problem is to compute the Type 3 pairing value e 3 (g 1 , g 2 )
αβγ . The decisional version DBDH-3 is defined analogously to DBDH-2. The BDH-3 (resp. DBDH-3) assumption asserts that BDH-3 (resp. DBDH-3) problem is hard.
At first glance it may appear that BDH-3 is a stronger assumption than BDH-2 as two extra elements, namely g β 1 , g γ 1 ∈ G 1 , are provided as input to BDH-3. However, note that one can easily compute these values in BDH-2 by virtue of ψ. Hence we consider these two problems as natural counterparts and in fact they are equivalent as we show in Lemma 3. Essentially the same argument also applies for the decisional versions DBDH-2 and DBDH-3.
Proof. First note that g
Hence, by Lemma 1, we have
The result then follows if we can establish that
for some c ∈ Z * n . Then BDH-2 and BDH-3 are equivalent.
Proof. Given a BDH-2 problem instance (g
1/c and g
and g
is given to the BDH-3 solver which returns e 3 (g 1 , g 2 )
αβγ from which the solution e 2 (g 1 , g
αβγ of the original BDH-2 problem is obtained by Lemma 2. This establishes that BDH-2 ≤ BDH-3.
Conversely, given a BDH-3 problem instance (g
c and g
c . The resulting BDH-2 problem instance (g
) is given to the BDH-2 solver which returns e 2 (g 1 , g
αβγ . Thereafter, the solution e 3 (g 1 , g 2 ) αβγ of the original BDH-3 problem is obtained showing that BDH-3 ≤ BDH-2. Currently there is no evidence to suggest that DHP is any easier in G 2 than in G ′ 2 , or, for that matter, co-DHP* is any easier than co-DHP (see §2.3 of [16] for a discussion on the relationship between co-DHP and co-DHP*).
Remark 2. (Variants of BDH ) As already noted, it is possible to formulate different versions of BDH in the asymmetric setting. Some of these variants have been used to argue the security of some existing protocols. For example, Smart and Vercauteren [37] discuss several such variants (including the relativized versions) and their relationships and show that the security of different versions of BF-IBE relies on different versions of the BDH problem. Boyen provides a general statement of the problem (called BDH') in [12] for all known pairing types, the earliest mention of which can be traced to [13] .
2 In Type 2 the problem is to compute e 2 (g 1 , g
we call this problem BDH-2b. Clearly BDH-2b and BDH-2 are equivalent. The analogous problem in Type 3, which we call BDH-3b, is obtained by replacing elements of G ′ 2 by elements of G 2 and the task is to compute e 3 (g 1 , g 2 ) αβγ . However, it is not known whether BDH-3b is equivalent to BDH-3 (or for that matter to BDH-2 or BDH-2b). Still another variant in Type 3, which we call BDH-3c, is to compute e 3 (g 1 , g 2 ) αβγ given g
. BDH-3c is attributed to Galbraith in [12] . It is easy to see that BDH-3 ≤ BDH-3b ≤ BDH-3c, but currently we do not know anything in the reverse direction.
Other assumptions.
A large array of complexity assumptions have been proposed so far in pairing groups; see [12] for a listing of such assumptions. Most of these assumptions come in two flavors -computational and decisional as in the case of BDH. Many of these assumptions were initially introduced in the symmetric setting to be generalized later in the asymmetric setting. As we have noted, some authors [37, 19, 18 ] also used the notion of relativized assumption in the Type 3 setting -assuming that the problem remains hard even when the adversary is given oracle access to ψ.
Their apparent diversity notwithstanding, the complexity assumptions in pairing groups can be broadly classified into two categories.
(i) Assumptions where the problem does not explicitly involve any element from G Texamples are co-DHP, Linear, Strong DH, Hidden SDH, and Poly-SDH.
(ii) Assumptions where the problem involves a pairing computation and hence element of G T -examples are BDH, Bilinear DH Inversion, and Bilinear DH Exponent. Given a hardness assumption in the Type 2 setting, our primary concern here is to formulate its natural counterpart in Type 3. Note that if one is given some element g Remark 3. (weakening assumptions) For some cryptographic protocols in Type 3, it might be possible to drop one or more elements of G 1 from the statement of P-3 without affecting the reduction. For example, BF-IBE-3 can be proven secure under BDH-3b (see §4.1.1). However, we do not know any protocol that can be proven secure under the seemingly weaker assumption BDH-3c. Note that the input to BDH-3c includes only g
, whereas all known security reductions based on BDH in the asymmetric setting require at least one of g β 1 or g γ 1 as part of the problem input. The situation is similar for the "weaker statement" of the Linear assumption in Type 3 as stated in [12] (also attributed to Galbraith). In fact an interesting open question is to what extent one can prune P-3 and still use it in the security reduction of a natural cryptographic problem.
Protocols in the Asymmetric Setting
We revisit some existing pairing-based protocols in the asymmetric setting. Some of these protocols employ the isomorphism ψ in the protocol itself and some others only in the security reduction. The purpose of this investigation is twofold -to determine the exact role played by ψ in the functionality and security of these protocols and then to investigate whether it is possible to avoid the use of ψ altogether.
4.1.
Protocols where ψ is used in the security argument only. Several authors have used ψ to argue the security of pairing-based protocols in the asymmetric settings -these protocols include signature [10, 5, 7] , encryption [8, 18] , and key agreement [19] schemes.
The case of the BLS signature scheme has already been discussed in detail in [16] . Several other signature schemes also use ψ in the security reduction including Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme [5] , the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham short group signature scheme [7] , and the Delerablé-Pointcheval anonymous short group signature [15] . In a later version [6] Boneh and Boyen modified the security argument of their short signature scheme in [5] to remove the necessity of ψ; the same argument can also be used for the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham short group signature scheme.
We would like to argue in general that it is possible to avoid ψ in the security argument. As illustrative examples we consider the case of BF-IBE and an identity-based key agreement protocol. Our arguments are quite general and are applicable to other protocols. 4.1.1. Boneh-Franklin IBE. For simplicity we focus on the basic version of the BF-IBE protocol (called BasicIdent in [8] ). This protocol was originally described in the symmetric setting but can also be implemented in the asymmetric setting [26, 37] . In contrast to previous findings, our study indicates that Type 3 is indeed a better choice than Type 2 for BF-IBE taking into account functionality, security and efficiency.
BF-IBE-2. The master secret of the key generation center (KGC) is x ∈ R Z n and the corresponding public key is g pub = g ′ 2 x ∈ G ′ 2 . Given a user identity id ∈ {0, 1} * , the public key of the user is h id = H 1 (id) ∈ G 1 , where
r = e 2 (h id , g pub ) r . The security of BF-IBE-2 is argued by a reduction from BDH-2 to the breaking of BF-IBE-2.
BF-IBE-3. The above scheme can be directly implemented in Type 3 -the KGC's public key is g pub = g x 2 ∈ G 2 and the ephemeral key in the ciphertext will be g r 2 ∈ G 2 . The security of BF-IBE-3 is argued by a reduction from BDH-3b to the breaking of BF-IBE-3.
A variant of BF-IBE in Type 3 can be obtained by hashing the identities into G 2 . We call this variant BF-IBE-3b which gives a smaller ciphertext overhead. Such an optimization is not possible for BF-IBE-2 as we do not know how to hash into G BF-IBE-3b. The KGC's master public key is g pub = g
* → G 2 and so both h id = H 1 (id) and d id are in G 2 . To encrypt M ∈ {0, 1} n a sender chooses r R ∈ Z n and sends g r 1 , M ⊕ H 2 (e(g pub , h id ) r ) . The receiver computes H 2 (e(g r 1 , d id )) and xors it with the second component of the ciphertext to obtain M . The security of BF-IBE-3b is argued by a reduction from BDH-3b.
The ciphertext overhead in BF-IBE-3b is one element of G 1 (namely g r 1 ), while that in BF-IBE-2 is one element of G ′ 2 . Furthermore, exponentiation in G 1 is faster than exponentiation in G ′ 2 , and hence BF-IBE-3b is a better choice as far as performance is concerned. Smart and Vercauteren [37] observed that the security of BF-IBE-3 can be reduced to either BDH-3c with oracle access to ψ or to BDH-3b without such oracle access. In the first case one does not know how to simulate the oracle and in the second case they consider the problem (which they call coBDH 1,2 ) to be "somewhat unnatural". Based on these observations they conclude that one should use a pairing with an efficiently-computable isomorphism, i.e., Type 2 for BF-IBE. However, as we have already noted, BDH-3b is at least as hard as BDH-2 and so Type 3 is overall a better choice for BF-IBE.
SCK-1 identity-based key agreement.
In [19] , Chen, Cheng and Smart examine the security and efficiency of several identity-based key agreement protocols in the context of different types of pairings. They show that the protocol originally proposed by Smart [36] and later modified by Chen and Kudla [20] (called SCK-1 and SCK-2 in [19] ) and an enhanced version due to McCullagh and Barreto [32, 21] (called e-MB-2 in [19] ) can be proven secure in the asymmetric setting. Both reductions employ the map ψ and hence in Type 3 depend on a relativized assumption, i.e., oracle access to ψ. It should be noted that the protocols themselves do not require ψ.
The security reductions are quite involved (and run into several pages). However, it is possible to avoid the map ψ in the security argument by including some extra elements of G 1 in the problem instance of the respective complexity assumption for Type 3 in the manner described in §3. Here we provide a high-level description of how this can be achieved for the security argument of SCK-1. A similar approach is applicable for SCK-2 and e-MB-2.
Protocol SCK-1 in Type 3. The KGC's master secret key is s ∈ R Z n and the corresponding master public key is R = g s 2 . Given an identity string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the KGC obtains the public key as h ID = H 1 (ID), where H 1 : {0, 1} * → G 1 is a publicly computable hash function. The corresponding private key is d ID = h s ID ∈ G 1 . Two parties, A and B with key pairs (h A , d A ) and (h B , d B ) respectively, run the protocol as follows:
A (resp. B) checks whether E B (resp. E A ) belongs to G 2 . If the check is successful
The session key is SK = H 2 (A, B, E A , E B , g xy 2 , K), where H 2 is another publicly computable hash function.
The authors consider the random oracle model. Session key security of SCK-1 in the Type 3 setting is established assuming the hardness of BDH-3c with oracle access to ψ, and forward secrecy under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption in G 2 with oracle access to ψ. We do not elaborate on the security arguments -interested readers can consult Theorems 1 and 2 in [19] . Instead, we only indicate how ψ can be avoided.
In Theorem 1, the simulator invokes the oracle ψ to compute either ψ(g
where g β 2 is part of the BDH-3c problem instance and r ∈ R Z n is chosen by the simulator. The simulator can easily compute the corresponding values without the oracle if it is provided with g β 1 ∈ G 1 as part of the problem instance, which means the security now depends on BDH-3b. This is perfectly acceptable, because the security of SCK-1 in Type 2 depends upon BDH-2 and we know that BDH-3b is at least as hard as BDH-2.
In Theorem 2, given g a 2 , g b 2 and oracle access to ψ, the simulator interacts with the adversary to compute g ab 2 . The oracle is used in a pairing computation which is either of the form e 3 (ψ(X), Y ) or e 3 (ψ(Y ), X) where (X, Y ) are the protocol messages exchanged in a key agreement session. At least one of these messages, say X ∈ G 2 , is chosen by the simulator and set to either g ar 2 or g br 2 , where r ∈ R Z n is chosen by the simulator. So the simulator can compute ψ(X) without oracle access to ψ if she is also provided with g 4.2. Protocols employing ψ. Some protocols employ ψ in the protocol itself. For example consider the verifiably encrypted signature scheme and ring signature scheme of Boneh, Gentry, Lynn and Shacham (BGLS) [9] and the group signature scheme with verifier-local revocation of Boneh and Shacham [11] . Here we describe the ring signature scheme and its security argument in the original Type 2 setting and then show how one can easily modify both to allow working in the Type 3 setting. A similar argument applies to the verifiably encrypted signature scheme. As observed in [37] , the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme cannot be implemented in either Type 2 or Type 3 (cf. footnote 3).
A ring signature on a message is constructed using the public keys of a set U of users and the private key of a single user u ∈ U . The verification process gives the assurance that the signature was produced using one of the private keys of U but the verifier should not be able to determine which particular u ∈ U signed the message. This is the so-called signer-ambiguity property of a ring signature.
BGLS-2 ring signature scheme. Let e 2 : G 1 ×G ′ 2 → G T be a Type 2 pairing and ψ : G ′ 2 → G 1 be an efficiently-computable isomorphism with ψ(g ′ 2 ) = g 1 . The signature scheme employs a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . An individual signer's private key is an integer x ∈ R Z n and her public key is X = (g ′ 2 )
x . Given the public keys X 1 , . . . , X ℓ of a set U of ℓ users, a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , and a private key x s corresponding to one of the users in U whose public key is X s , the signer chooses a i ∈ R Z n for each i = s and computes h = H(M ) and σ s = (h/ψ( i =s X ai i )) 1/xs . She also computes σ i = g ai 1 for each i = s. The ring signature on M is σ = σ 1 , . . . , σ ℓ . Given (M, σ), the verifier computes h = H(M ) and accepts if and only if e 2 (h, g
The correctness of the verification algorithm can be easily checked using the bilinear property. We show this for ℓ = 2 and s = 1. For h = H(M ), we have
Thus e 2 (σ 1 , X 1 )e 2 (σ 2 , X 2 ) = e 2 ((hg
. There are two aspects of security for a ring signature scheme -signer ambiguity and unforgeability. Using a probabilistic argument it was shown in [9] that the signer's identity is unconditionally protected. Unforgeability is based on the following complexity assumption: given g ab 1 and g ′ 2 b it is hard to compute g a 1 . We call it the co-divisible computational DiffieHellman (co-DCDH) assumption -see [2] for the statement of DCDH in the Diffie-Hellman setting. Here we briefly reproduce the original security argument.
Security argument. For simplicity, we assume ℓ = 2; the argument can be easily extended to any ℓ > 2. Given g x2 for some x 2 ∈ R Z n , and gives X 1 , X 2 to the adversary A. On receiving a hash query, S flips a coin which shows 0 with some probability p and 1 otherwise; S selects r ∈ R Z n and returns (g for some a 2 ∈ R Z n . When A outputs a valid forgery on some message M , S first checks that the output of the coin flip for the corresponding hash query on M was 0; otherwise it aborts. Then, H(M ) = g abr 1 for some r chosen by S and S returns (σ 1 σ x2
)
1/r as the solution to its own challenge. This completes the argument.
The map ψ is used in the protocol itself when the signer computes ψ(X ai i ), and also in the security argument to compute ψ(g ′ 2 b ) when simulating the random oracle H. Both these uses, however, can be easily avoided as we detail below.
BGLS-3 ring signature scheme. Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a Type 3 pairing and H : {0, 1} * → G 1 a hash function. The private key of an individual signer is x ∈ R Z n and her public key is (W = g
. A certification authority entrusted with certifying the public key should verify that W ∈ G 1 , X ∈ G 2 , W = 1, X = 1, and e(g 1 , X) = e(W, g 2 ).
Note that the public key effectively gives ψ(X) = W though we do not have any means to compute ψ when supplied with a random element of G 2 . Except for this modification BGLS-3 is identical to BGLS-2. In the signing algorithm, the signer now uses W i in place of ψ(X i ). The unforgeability of BGLS-3 can be established under the co-DCDH* assumption that given g . Breaking BGLS-3 is thus seen to be equivalent to solving co-DCDH * .
Note that in BGLS-3 the signer only needs the G 1 component of the public keys of the other users in U whereas the verifier only needs the G 2 component of the public keys of users in U . They can respectively ignore the other component from G 2 or G 1 , thus leading to decreased communication bandwidth and computational cost than in BGLS-2.
Transforming a Protocol from Type 2 to Type 3
As case studies we have discussed in the last section how some known protocols in the Type 2 setting can be transformed to the Type 3 setting without affecting the functionality or security. We generalize these observations and propose some guidelines on how to transform an arbitrary Type-2 protocol, Protocol-2, to a Type-3 protocol, Protocol-3, where Protocol-3 is at least as secure as Protocol-2 and it is possible to achieve a better performance.
Before delving into the guidelines let's consider a (hypothetical) situation where such a transformation is not possible. Suppose that a protocol in the Type 2 setting involves a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G ′ 2 and the following steps -given a public string str ∈ {0, 1} * , first obtain X = H(str) ∈ G ′ 2 and then compute ψ(X) ∈ G 1 . This protocol cannot be transformed into Type 3 because given a random X ∈ G 2 one does not know how to compute ψ(X) ∈ G 1 . However, the protocol cannot be implemented in Type 2 either, because we do not know how to hash into G ′ 2 in the first place.
3 Hence in the following we assume that Protocol-2 does not require hashing into G ′ 2 and argue that it is always possible to naturally transform it into Protocol-3.
Suppose we have a protocol, Protocol-2, and its security reduction with respect to some hard problem P-2. Let P-3 be the natural counterpart of P-2 in Type 3 as described in §3. Our aim is to obtain the corresponding Protocol-3 with an analogous security reduction with respect to P-3. Protocol-2 will typically include elements from G 1 , G ′ 2 and G T and so also the corresponding security reduction. (In the security reduction, the challenger simulates the protocol environment for an attacker based on the given instance of the hard problem.) The elements of G 1 and G T will not be affected in any way when we convert Protocol-2 and its security reduction to Type 3. So our primary concern will be with the elements of G (for simplicity we assume c = 1). Recall from §2.2 that for any elliptic curve with even embedding degree, the task of computing the Type 2 pairing e 2 : G 1 × G ′ 2 → G T can be easily reduced to the task of computing the Type 3 pairing e 3 :
Recall also from §2.3 that every element X ∈ G ′ 2 can be represented by the pair (X 1 , X 2 ) = (ψ(X), ρ(X)) ∈ G 1 × G 2 . Given Protocol-2 and its reductionist security argument with respect to P-2, let's first consider the following 'preliminary' transformation. Represent each X ∈ G ′ 2 appearing in Protocol-2 by (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ G 1 × G 2 . Also make similar changes in the problem instance of P-2 and the security reduction.
It is easy to see that any protocol in the Type 2 setting as well as its security argument can be rewritten in this way where elements of G ′ 2 are represented by elements of G 1 ×G 2 . By Lemma 2, computing a Type 2 pairing e 2 (·, X) is equivalent to computing the Type 3 pairing value e 3 (·, X 2 ), and hence it is possible to employ e 3 directly instead of e 2 in the protocol. It is now possible to argue the security of this "modified" protocol with respect to P-3. This new representation allows a better performance than the conventional representation of a protocol in the Type 2 setting without affecting functionality and security.
However, just because the protocol is now described in terms of elements of G 1 , G 2 and G T does not necessarily mean that we are no longer in the Type 2 setting. What really changed is the representation of elements of G ′ 2 , i.e., each X ∈ G ′ 2 involved in Protocol-2 will now be written as (ψ(X), ρ(X)) ∈ G 1 × G 2 . But for some protocols (and their security arguments) it might be sufficient to work only with the G 2 component of X and the G 1 component is actually redundant. In that case one can drop those redundant elements of G 1 from the protocol description without affecting functionality and security. The modified protocol will now be in the Type 3 setting and (in most cases) allows a still better performance.
We illustrate this process of transformation with an example -the SCK-1 protocol of §4.1.2. We start with the protocol in Type 2 with new representation of G ′ 2 . Then for each X = (X 1 , X 2 ) ∈ G ′ 2 in the protocol description, check whether X 1 = ψ(X) ∈ G 1 is necessary for the protocol or the security argument; if not then X 1 is dropped. At the end we get the corresponding protocol description in Type 3.
Protocol SCK-1 in Type 2. The KGC has a master secret key s ∈ R Z n and a corresponding master public key R = g
Given an identity string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , the corresponding public and private keys are obtained as in §4.1.2, i.e.,
Two parties, A and B with key pairs (h A , d A ) and (h B , d B ) respectively, run the protocol as follows: 2 ∈ G 2 . Also note that e 2 (·, R) can be easily computed from e 3 (·, R 2 ) and similarly e 2 (·, X) and e 2 (·, Y ). So the new representation of G ′ 2 allows a much better performance than the conventional representation (cf. §2.3). However, we are still in the Type 2 setting. Now we consider whether it is possible to drop any of the G 1 components R 1 , X 1 , Y 1 of the G ′ 2 elements R, X, Y from the protocol description without affecting functionality and security. This can be a two-step process. First we check whether, for example, X 1 = ψ(X) (and not just X) is explicitly used at any stage in the protocol or the security argument. If there is no such use we discard X 1 from the protocol description. Otherwise in the next step we check whether it is still possible to obtain X 1 without recourse to ψ. In that case also we drop X 1 from the protocol description.
Investigating this way we observe that R 1 is not used in the protocol but the simulator needs it in the security argument. However, in the simulation R 1 is provided as part of the original problem instance so we can drop it from the protocol description. Next consider the G 1 component of the protocol messages, i.e., X 1 and Y 1 . They too do not play any independent role in the protocol (apart from being a part of the representation of X and Y ) while in the security argument one of them (but not both) is explicitly used by the simulator. So it may appear at first sight that we have to provide X 1 and Y 1 as part of the protocol message. However, in a typical simulation of a key-agreement session at least one of the messages (say X) is chosen by the simulator. As we already argued in §4.1.2, the simulator can directly compute X 1 based on what she received as part of the problem instance. So we can drop X 1 and Y 1 and modify the protocol so that the protocol messages are elements of G 2 only (i.e., X 2 , Y 2 ). Note that in the modified protocol A derives the session key as SK = H 2 (A, B, X 2 , Y 2 , Y x 2 , K) (and analogously for B). This modified protocol achieves a better performance both in terms of communication bandwidth and computational cost because the users are no longer burdened with the unnecessary G 1 components of the messages and the master public key. Once these G 1 components are dropped there is no way to obtain the conventional representation of the corresponding elements of G ′ 2 or to apply ψ to them and we are actually in the Type 3 setting. The transformation discussed above gives us the essential cue for the actual transformation from Protocol-2 to Protocol-3. Namely, for each X ∈ G ′ 2 involved in a particular step of Protocol-2 or its security argument, the corresponding step in Protocol-3 or its security argument requires the computation of X 2 ∈ G 2 , and also X 1 ∈ G 1 if ψ(X) is necessary for the protocol or its security argument. 4 Note that in Protocol-3 and its security argument, X 2 can be obtained in the same way as X in the case of Protocol-2. However, we must have some means to obtain X 1 in Type 3 when necessary. The transformation will fail only when we are unable to do so.
In Protocol-2, X can be part of the static data such as the private key, the public key or the public parameters, or the "run-time" data, e.g., a signature, a ciphertext, or the ephemeral key in a key agreement protocol. Given Protocol-2 and its security reduction, we consider these situations separately for the conversion.
Private data contains an element X ∈ G ′ 2 . If either the protocol or the security reduction requires ψ(X) then include both X 1 ∈ G 1 and X 2 ∈ G 2 in the private information in Protocol-3. If neither requires ψ(X) then include only X 2 .
Public data contains an element X ∈ G ′ 2 . X can be part of the public key of a user when in the traditional public-key setting or it can be part of the KGC's public parameters when in the identity-based setting. Whatever be the case, the entity who generated X must also know its discrete log with respect to a known base in G ′ 2 (since hashing into G ′ 2 is not feasible). There are two possibilities depending on whether the protocol uses ψ(X) or not. 1. Protocol-2 employs ψ(X): Replace X = g ′ 2 x in the public data of Protocol-2 with
. This is always doable because the entity who generated X must know x. In the traditional PKI setting a certification authority entrusted with certifying the public key can easily verify whether they are properly generated or not, and in the identity-based setting they are assumed to be properly generated by the trusted KGC. If in Protocol-2 a user Alice requires only ψ(X) (resp. X) then she will be concerned with only X 1 (resp. X 2 ) in Protocol-3. This is the case for the BGLS-3 ring signature scheme which, as we have already noted, performs better than the BGLS-2 ring signature because now the ring signer is concerned only with the G 1 component of the public key of the other signers in the group whereas the verifier is concerned only with the G 2 components. They can respectively ignore the G 2 and G 1 components of the public key leading to decreased communication bandwidth. 2. ψ(X) is necessary for the security argument of Protocol-2: Replace X = g ′ 2 x in Protocol-2 with X 2 = g x 2 in Protocol-3, as was done in the case of BF-IBE-3 in §4.1.1, and BLS-3 and Waters-3a in [16] . This allows smaller public keys and hence (sometimes) less computation in Protocol-3. In some protocols it might still be necessary to include X 1 = g x 1 in the public key. For example, X 1 may be required for the reduction to go through as in the BGLS-3 4 Intuitively, we consider ψ(X) to be 'necessary' if either ψ(X) or some ψ(Y ) is required in the protocol or the security argument where Y ∈ G ′ 2 is 'derived' from X. We don't know how to formulate this statement rigorously.
aggregate signature scheme (see [16] ). Note that even if X 1 were included in the public key or the public parameters, it would never be required in the actual protocol run. So the users will effectively ignore X 1 in their computation, which in turn will lead to better optimization in terms of communication bandwidth and perhaps even computational cost compared to Protocol-2.
Protocol message contains elements of G ′ 2 . Suppose that in Protocol-2 Bob receives a message from Alice containing some Y ∈ G ′ 2 . Alice may compute Y either solely based on her secret information or in combination with some public data, such as Bob's public key or the system-wide public parameters. If Bob requires ψ(Y ) then in Protocol-3 Alice should send both Y 1 ∈ G 1 and Y 2 ∈ G 2 to Bob. This is doable but, to the best of our knowledge, is not required by any existing protocol. If Bob's computation in Protocol-2 depends only on Y then it is sufficient in Protocol-3 to send only Y 2 . However, for the known security argument of some protocols to go through, it might be necessary to send Y 1 also. For example, in the security argument of BF-IBE-3 it is sufficient to send the G 2 component only of the ephemeral key, while for the security argument of the Waters-3b signature scheme (see [16] ) we need both the G 1 and G 2 components for one of the signature components. In the former case, Protocol-3 will be more optimized than Protocol-2 while it will be at least as efficient as Protocol-2 in the latter. Now consider the security reduction for Protocol-3 where the challenger simulates the protocol environment for an adversary based on the problem instance in the given security model. Note that Protocol-3 is derived based on both Protocol-2 and its security reduction. Once we have obtained Protocol-3 in this manner, it is relatively straightforward to modify the security argument of Protocol-2 to get an analogous security argument for Protocol-3.
Like the protocol, our only concern here is with those elements X ∈ G ′ 2 for which the challenger needs to compute ψ(X) in the simulation. Note that if X is part of the problem instance of P-2 then by definition both X 1 and X 2 must be part of the problem instance of P-3. So we only need to consider the following two situations in the simulation in Type 2 and show how one can obtain X 1 in each case in Type 3. 1. X is part of the message sent by the adversary: This can only happen if there is an analogous step in Protocol-2 and has been taken care of when we transformed it into Protocol-3. Namely the corresponding message in Protocol-3 includes both X 1 and X 2 and hence the adversary must send both to the challenger. 2. The challenger generates X: The challenger cannot generate this by hashing into G ′ 2 . So the challenger can generate X either solely based on its own random coin tosses, or along with that randomness it may also depend on the adversary's input or the problem instance P-2. Whatever be the case, the challenger will have enough information to generate both X 1 and X 2 in the security reduction of Protocol-3.
Concluding Remarks
Many pairing-based protocols in the asymmetric setting rely on the existence of an efficiently-computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , i.e., the Type 2 setting. Some earlier works in pairing-based cryptography gave the impression that such an isomorphism is necessary for the functionality or the security of the protocols (or both). In contrast, we have argued that relying on such an isomorphism is more of an artifact of initial research in this area rather than an actual necessity as far as the functionality and security of the protocols are concerned. Moreover, restricting a protocol to such a setting in most cases has a negative impact on performance.
In particular, we have provided evidence in support of the following assertions:
(1) For any hard problem P-2 in the Type 2 setting, there is a natural counterpart P-3 in the Type 3 setting which is equally hard. (2) Any protocol Protocol-2 and its security argument based on P-2 in the Type 2 setting can be naturally converted to Protocol-3 with an analogous security argument based on P-3 in the Type 3 setting. (3) Protocol-3 is at least as efficient as Protocol-2 and in most cases outperforms Protocol-2. In some situations one can further optimize Protocol-3, for example, by hashing into G 2 instead of G 1 as is the case with BF-IBE-3b. Such optimizations are not possible for Protocol-2 as it is not known how to hash into G ′ 2 . Setting aside the question of performance, our study indicates that there is no major difference of cryptographic significance when a protocol originally described in the Type 2 setting is transformed into Type 3. This leads us to posit the question of whether there exists a cryptographic protocol which necessarily has to be restricted to Type 2 for implementation or security reasons. We conclude with the following remarks and question.
(1) Some authors have used the extended Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption to argue the security of their protocols [7, 14, 15] . The XDH assumption requires that the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in G 1 . If it is also required that DDH is hard in G 2 then the corresponding assumption is called symmetric XDH (SXDH) [1] . Note that in the Type 2 setting, DDH is easy in G ′ 2 because of ψ. Hence, the protocols described in [1, 39] where security is based on the SXDH assumption cannot be instantiated securely in Type 2 (but can be implemented in Type 3 since DDH is believed to be hard in G 2 ). On the other hand, if some Protocol-2 or its security argument requires DDH to be hard in G 1 but easy in G ′ 2 , then it may appear at first glance that Protocol-2 cannot be converted to the Type 3 setting. However, we expect that the conversion would be possible by adding the appropriate elements from G 1 to the protocol or its security argument in the same manner as was used earlier to avoid ψ. We are not aware of the existence of any such protocols. (2) In Type 3 it is possible to make a minimalist complexity assumption such as BDH3c as proposed by Galbraith [12] . Such minimalist assumptions do not have any counterpart in Type 2. The question is whether there exists a protocol whose security is based on such an assumption. (3) Some protocols, such as the Boneh-Shacham group signature scheme with verifierlocal revocation [11] and the SYL, RYY and BMP identity-based key agreement protocols (see [19] ), that involve hashing into G 2 followed by an application of ψ on the resulting hash values cannot be implemented in either Type 2 or Type 3. However, they can be implemented using Type 1 and Type 4 pairings (cf. [17] ).
